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ABSTRACT

The study of national learning has been severely
handicapped by the inability of scholars in the field to
arrive at a consensus regarding the means by which nations
learn.
The purpose of this study is to help the field in
its efforts to arrive at a common understanding of the
dynamics of national learning.
This study first reviews the literature on national
learning and describes one model of national learning
created by Jack Levy.
Levy's conceptualization of national
learning identifies the individual learning experience of
the bureaucrat or policy-maker as the starting point for
national learning.
According to Levy, following the
personal learning experience of such a decision-maker, the
individual then encodes his new-found beliefs into
bureaucratic procedure.
When this occurs within a
governmental bureaucracy, national learning occurs, as the
government is permanently predisposed to certain decisions
as a result of the change in rules or procedures made by the
individual learner.
The study next tests Levy's model in an attempt to
determine if in fact its conceptualization of national
learning is helpful to the field.
Using the case of Jimmy
Carter's dramatic personal learning experience following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this study finds Levy's
definition to be lacking in both explanatory power as well
as in its ability to predict when national learning will
occur.
In its third and final phase, the study presents a new
conceptualization of the dynamics of national learning.
The
proposed new model identifies public opinion as the catalyst
to national learning.
As the public learns, it induces
legislators, through the power of public opinion, to make
changes in bureaucratic procedure which are permanent.
Thus, national learning occurs.
The study finds the new
conceptualization of national learning to be more useful
than Levy's in understanding the dynamics of national
learning.
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TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF NATIONAL LEARNING

INTRODUCTION

It is an eternal hope of man that nations will learn
from history and the mistakes of other nations gone before
and so steer a safer course for the future. But how do
nations 11learn", if they learn at all?

What is the

mechanism by which a nation learns lessons from the past?
These questions are not merely academic in nature.

Rather,

their answers have profound implications for our world and
the world of future generations.

For if we can determine if

in fact nations learn and identify the mechanism by which
this learning occurs, we will be able to enhance our
understanding of the international arena and predict much
more accurately the behavior of states based on this
improved understanding.
Unfortunately,

the literature on national learning is

lacking in consensus regarding the fundamental meaning of
the concept of national learning.
liberally,

Though the term is used

it appears that there exist almost as many

theories regarding the means through which nations learn as
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there are scholars in the field.
do not vary by nuance.

Moreover,

these theories

Rather, each model is distinctive in

its identification of the key actors,

learning mechanisms

and dependent variables involved in the national learning
process.

This lack of consensus poses obstacles to the

advancement of the field.

Much could be added to the field

by the testing of some of the existing theories on national
learning in an effort to eliminate those which prove to be
of little utility in understanding the phenomena.
In this paper,

I first offer a brief overview of the

concepts of learning as they relate to learning at the
national level.

Second,

I focus on one type of national

learning theory which identifies bureaucratic change as the
dependent variable and select one model from this group,
Jack Levy's,

to evaluate its usefulness in understanding the

dynamics of national learning.

I select Levy's model

because it is the most falsifiable of all the models
reviewed.

Jimmy Carter's learning experience following the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is used as the test case.
find that though Levy's model predicts that national
learning will occur as a result of individual learning by

I
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policy-makers,
does not occur.
Finally,

the Carter case study shows that this in fact
Thus, Levy's model is found to be lacking.
I offer an alternative means of understanding

national learning which also identifies bureaucratic change
as the dependent, variable but identifies a different
learning mechanism from Levy's.

Focusing on public opinion

as the impetus to national learning,

rather than the

learning experiences of individual policy-makers,

this model

identifies the key actor in national learning to be the
public,

the learning mechanism to be the power of public

opinion which induces legislators to affect change in
bureaucratic procedure,
bureaucratic change.

and the dependent variable to be

I believe this model to be of greater

use to the field in its efforts to understand the dynamics
of national learning.

I.

OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ON LEARNING

Conceptions of learning in the field of international
relations include a broad range of widely differing models.
These models may be best understood if they are analyzed
according to their conceptualizations of the three
fundamental components of a learning model.
component is the actor.

The first

While some models focus on key

individuals within government,

others perceive institutions

to be the key actors in national learning.
variable is the learning process itself.

The second
Scholars differ on

the question of exactly what constitutes "learning".
Different learning mechanisms are advanced by each model,
some varying by nuance,
conceptualizations.

others by significantly differing

Finally,

these models vary in their

identification of the dependent variable.

While some seek

to understand policy change, others view change in
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bureaucratic procedure or individual belief change as the
dependent variable.
The neorealist approach to learning is distinct from
other models in several ways.

First, because this school

believes that national learning occurs as a result of events
at the international level,

its primary actor is neither an

individual nor an institution,

but rather the nation-state

as a whole, with its dependent variable being policy change.
Foreign policy-making at the national level,
the Neorealists,

according to

is a "black box"--the thought processes of

national decision-makers or the ways in which governmental
organizational cultures affect these decision-makers are not
analyzed.

Second,

the neorealist approach is distinct in

its model of the learning process.
this model maintains,

In an anarchic system,

learning at the national level

"involves the rational adjustment of policy in response to
the reward and punishment contingencies of the international
environment."1

Failure to learn results in a sort of

^■Philip E. Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet
Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept," in
Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign P olicy, e d s . George
W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1991), 22.

Darwinian natural selection process in which those who are
slow to learn do not survive.
Thus,

the neorealists believe,

"rational" governments

respond to the incentives of the international environment
in order to survive.

Because the punishment for "incorrect

action is elimination from the system,

the decision-maker

must act in accordance with the dictates of the structure o
the international environment.2

Hence,

greater analysis of

the decision-maker or the organizational structure through
which he operates is not necessary as international
structural factors are the primary determinant of foreign
policy.
In direct opposition to the neorealist approach are
those who believe that sole reliance on the structural
factors of the international community in explaining the
actions of states is unsatisfactory.
maintain that in a complex world,
ambiguity.

These scholars

there is much causal

Often, policy-makers receive contradictory

feedback and interpretations of events which make the
"rational" policy difficult to determine.

Thus,

"in an

international environment that is complex to the point of

2I b i d . , 24.
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indeterminate,

even rational actors may be unable to

anticipate the long-range consequences of their actions."3
For this reason, many scholars believe that learning at
the domestic level needs to be taken into much greater
account.

Among those who believe that domestic politics

play a significant role in learning at the national level,
there are two distinct bodies of thought.

The first

includes those who believe that studying the learning
processes of individual decision-makers is key to
understanding learning at the national level.
this group,

the individual is the key actor.

According to
These scholars

often borrow theories from the science of Psychology and
apply them to beliefs regarding the international arena in
order to better understand learning among key decision
makers .
The second group includes those scholars who believe
that in order to understand national learning we must
examine political institutions and processes,

since

government as a whole is comprised of such organizations and
decision-makers are constrained by them.

Not only are

decision-makers constrained by bureaucratic procedure and

3I b i d .,27.
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rules of accountability, but they are often jockeying among
themselves for influence which further constrains their
actions as they must negotiate with one another.

Thus,

this

group of scholars identifies institutions as the key actors
in models of national learning.

In creating these models,

scholars often borrow theories from the literature on
organizational learning and apply it to governmental
institutions to better understand learning at the national
level,

as they perceive the governmental learning to involve

"the aggregation of learning by multiple organizations and
by multiple individuals acting either through organizations
or independently of them".4
Focusing on learning at the level of the individual
decision-maker are those adhering to the belief system
approach

(otherwise known as the cognitive psychological

approach).

According to this framework,

each decision-maker

has a simplified image of the international environment.
Emanating from this image are beliefs regarding the best
ways to cope with this environment.
three distinct levels:

These beliefs occur at

1)fundamental assumptions and policy

4Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy:
Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," in International
Organization 48 (Spring 1994), 289.

10

objectives,
beliefs.

2)strategic policy beliefs,

and 3)tactical

Learning involves change in the cognitive content

of these beliefs regarding the international environment.5
Thus,

the Belief System Approach identifies the individual

policy-maker as the primary actor and belief change as the
dependent variable in the learning process.
Within this group of scholars,

there are those,

such

as Philip Tetlock, who believe that learning can occur at
any of these three levels of belief.
learning as a generic concept,

Tetlock envisions

treating it broadly and then

differentiating among many types and degrees of learning.
As such, he "sees learning per se as a phenomenon that is to
be observed fairly frequently in foreign policy-making."6
According to Tetlock,

changes in beliefs at the tactical,

strategic or fundamental assumptions level of individuals
all qualify as learning,

although he believes that changes

in belief at the fundamental assumptions level
known as complex learning)

(otherwise

occur rarely.7

5I bi d ., 22.
6George W. Breslauer, "What Have We Learned About
Learning?" in Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign
P ol ic y. 826.
7I b i d .
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Ernst Haas,

in contrast, maintains that only a change

in belief at the level of fundamental assumptions truly
involves learning.

Haas defines learning as "any change in

behavior due to a change in perception about how to solve a
problem".8

According to Haas,

changes in belief at the

strategic and tactical levels regarding the international
environment are merely adaptation because they fail to
examine the implicit theories underlying policies.9
Haas uses individual learning theory to explain
learning at the organizational level.

According to Haas,

as

individuals within bureaucracies begin to question
fundamental beliefs regarding cause and effect,
arrive at a consensus of beliefs.

Thus,

they tend to

the following

occurs:
A common understanding of causes is likely to
trigger a shared understanding of solutions, and the
new chain implies a set of larger meanings about
life and nature not previously held in common by the
participants.10

8Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Learning: Some
Theoretical Speculations," in Learning in U.S. and
Soviet Foreign P o li cy . 63.
9I b i d ., 73.
10Ibid.
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Hence,

according to Haas, as individuals within

organizations arrive at newfound core beliefs,

the

organizations themselves tend to exhibit changes in
collective patterns of behavior and Haas says that the
organization has "learned".
Thus, Haas's conceptualization of national learning
involves a two stage process.

In the first stage,

the

individual is the

primary actor and the dependent variable

is belief change.

In the second stage, however,

individuals arrive at a consensus of beliefs,
institution

as

the

(being a collection of individuals)

is the

primary actor and bureaucratic change is the dependent
variable.

A fundamental problem with this theory is the

ambiguity inherent in the term "collective patterns of
behavior".

If we were to try to test this theory, what

patterns of behavior would we be examining?

The theory

suffers from the lack of a concrete dependent variable which
may be examined in order to determine if learning has
occ ur re d.
The cognitive structural approach offers yet another
approach to learning.

While the above-described belief

system approach focused on the cognitive content of o n e 1s
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image of the international arena,

the cognitive structural

approach examines the structural complexity of the image.
Like the belief system approach,

this model identifies

change in belief as the dependent variable.
Proponents of this approach to learning,
Etheredge,

such as LLoyd

define learning in terms of an increased

cognitive differentiation and integration of thought.11
Thus,

as "the number of logically distinct arguments or

considerations that a policy-maker takes into account in
judging an event or arriving at a decision"

increases,

learning occurs.12
The efficiency model of learning offers yet another
approach to individual learning.
conceptualization,

According to this

"learning has occurred whenever policy

makers have learned to match means and ends in more
efficient or effective ways."13
"efficient",

In order to become more

one can either "discover more effective

strategies for pursuing one's original goals,

i:LLloyd Etheredge, Can Governments Learn?
York: Pergamon Press, 1985).
12Tetlock,

32.

13Tetlock,

35.

or one can

(New
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redefine one's goals in more realistic ways."14
according to this model,

Thus,

the key actor is an individual

policy-maker and the dependent variable is the policy
itself.

An individual has "learned" if, as a result of

personal experience or observation,

he becomes more adept or

adroit at achieving the goals he values.

Hence,

this model

perceives the key actors to be individuals and policy change
to be dependent variable.
Implicit in the efficiency approach is the assumption
that there exists concrete or generally accepted evidence
which can be employed in evaluating whether or not the
individual has become more "efficient" in pursuing his
goals.

While this consensus may exist in very controlled

environments,

it is difficult to attain in the complexity of

the real world.

As Tetlock states,

"even the most tentative

generalizations about deterrence or decision-making evoke
spirited debate within the professional community".15

Thus,

determining if in fact learning has occurred using this
model can be difficult because there exists no

14Ibid.
15Ibid. , 36 .
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uncontroversial database that can be relied upon for
assessing the accuracy of decisions.
Yet another model of learning advocated by Emanuel
Adler emphasizes the role of ideas and epistemic communities
in changing policy.

Termed "evolutionary learning",

this

conceptualization of learning argues that policy-makers
learn from epistemic communities.

This approach links

expert knowledge to political power in explaining learning
at the national level and addresses how ideas become policy
and the role of experts in this process.16
efficiency model of national learning,

Like the

the evolutionary

learning model identifies the policy-maker as the key actor
and policy as the dependent variable.

Sarah Mendelson

builds on this model by focusing on the interplay of ideas,
the epistemic communities which support these ideas and "the
political process through which the ideas are
institutionalized and the people empowered."

Mendelson

argues that "ideas alone cannot explain any one outcome;
they must be understood,

rather,

in terms of the political

16Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation:
National Epistemic Communities and the International
Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,"
International Organization 46 (Winter 1992).
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process by which they are selected. 1,17
argues,

Thus, Mendelson

the domestic political analysis,

including

strategies for power consolidation and coalition building,
ideas and the epistemic communities promoting those ideas,
should be included in a model of national learning.18
Jack Levy approaches the study of national learning
from the institutional level, believing that because their
rules and procedures constrain policy-makers,

institutions

are key actors in the national learning process.
article,

In his

"Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual

Minefield," Levy states that "organizations do not learn in
the same sense that individuals do."

Rather,

they "learn

only through individuals who serve in those organizations,
by encoding individually learned inferences from experience
into organizational routines."19

According to Levy,

organizational learning involves "a multistage process in
which environmental feedback leads to individual learning,

17Sarah E. Mendelson, "Internal Battles and
External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan," World Politics 45 (Winter
1987-1988), 327.
18Ibid. , 359.
19Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy:
Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International
Organization 48 (Spring 1994), 287.
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which leads to a change in organizational behavior,
leads to further feedback."20

Thus,

which

if learning has

occurred at the national level, procedural changes should be
in evidence within the bureaucracies which would be most
closely related to the area in which learning has occurred.
In order to test such a theory, we must know more precisely
what is meant by "procedural changes".

Levy writes that

these changes involve' the "forms, rules, procedures,
conventions,

strategies,

and technologies around which

organizations are constructed and through which they
operate,

as well as the organizational culture and paradigms

through which they are interpreted".21

Hence,

Levy's model

identifies the institution as the key actor and bureaucratic
change the dependent variable.
Although much has been written about national learning
in recent years, very few scholars have actually tested the
variety of national learning models which have been
advanced.

This is unfortunate but understandable,

as many

of the national learning models lack a sufficiently welldefined means of determining if learning has occurred.

20Ibid. , 288.
21Ibid. , 287.

The
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models do not clearly articulate the specific changes which
need to be found in the dependent variable in order to
determine if learning has occurred.
tried to make clear,

Hence,

as Karl Popper

the theories are not scientific because

they are not falsifiable.22

As a result,

there exists an

abundance of existing theories in the field, but very little
consensus among scholars regarding which one is most useful
in understanding the dynamics of national learning.
One notable exception to this shortcoming among
national learning models is the above-described model by
Jack Levy.

Like Haas's model, Levy identifies the key actor

in national learning to be the governmental institution and
the dependent variable to be bureaucratic change.

However,

unlike Haas's model for institutional learning which vaguely
states that national learning has occurred when a
governmental institution exhibits a change in "collective
patterns of behavior",

Levy goes one step further and offers

a more exact means of determining if in fact learning has
occurred by specifying what is meant by "procedural
c ha ng es ".

He states clearly that bureaucracies should

22 See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific
D i s co ve r y. 9th Impression; London, Hutchinson, 1977.

exhibit changes in "forms,
strategies,

rules procedures,

and technologies1,23

conventions,

Because his model is the

most concrete one reviewed in its specification of changes
to be studied.in the dependent variable and is thus
falsifiable,

it is this model which will be evaluated in

this paper according to the contribution it makes to the
understanding of the national learning process.

23Ibid, 287.

II.

TESTING A MODEL OF NATIONAL LEARNING:

CARTER CASE STUDY

The goal of this thesis is twofold:

l)to contribute to

the study of national learning by testing one of the already
existing models of national learning

(Levy's)

in an effort

to evaluate its utility in understanding the dynamics of
national learning,

and 2) to offer an alternative model and

direction for research should the Levy model prove lacking.
The case study method serves the purpose of the first goal
well.

It is difficult to prove or confirm a theory using

the case study method because it is often impossible to test
all possible cases and thus the one disconfirming case could
be overlooked.

However,

in attempting to disprove a theory,

the case study method is satisfactory.
make sense of this case,

If the theory can't

then it is not useful.

For several reasons, Jimmy Carter's learning
experience following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 provides an ideal case with which to test Jack Levy's
theory of national learning.

Levy states that

20
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organizational learning begins with the individual - an
individual changes his beliefs as a result of an experience
and in turn encodes those new beliefs in the bureaucracy
through the revision of bureaucratic rules or procedures
which would predispose the bureaucracy towards future
decisions which would be consistent with the lessons
learned.24

Therefore,

in testing this definition,

we must

first look for an individual within the foreign pol ic y
making apparatus who fulfills two criteria.

First,

the

individual must have undergone a significant change in
belief as a result of personal experience which in turn
affected his decisions regarding foreign policy.

Second,

the individual must be in a powerful enough position to have
the ability to encode change reflecting his new found
beliefs into organizational procedure.
Jimmy Carter fulfills these requirements on both
counts and uhus provides the ideal case study with which to
test Levy's theory.

First,

invasion of Afghanistan,

in 1979,

following the Soviet

Carter dramatically changed his

fundamental beliefs regarding the inherent nature of the
U.S.S.R.

Thus,

even according to Haas's restrictive

24I b i d . , 288.

22

definition of learning requiring a change in fundamental
assumptions and beliefs,
his own admission,

Carter as an individual clearly, by

learned with regards to the nature of the

Soviet Union.
Second,

Carter was in a position to affect change

within the bureaucracies of the foreign policy-making
apparatus.

It is difficult to imagine an individual with

more power to make procedural changes within government
organizations than the President of the United States.
Carter,

unlike his predecessor,

Richard Nixon, who to a

large degree delegated foreign policy formulation to Henry
Kissinger,

wanted to take the lead in formulating foreign

policy and to be intimately involved in all policy
decisions.
Advisor,

Testifying to this, his National Security

Zbigniew Brzezinski,

writes:

His personal involvement in the foreign policy
process was assertive and extensive.
He engaged
himself deeply and he mastered impressively the
technical arcana of the key issues...He made it
clear to all that he was in c h a r g e . ..25
Thus,

Carter clearly had not only the power to affect change

within the foreign policy-making apparatus,

but the

25Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 521.

(New
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interest,

as well.

Because Carter meets these two

requirements so well,
Levy's theory.

this case is an ideal one for testing

If Levy's model is a good one we should see

some change in bureaucratic procedure during the Carter
years commensurate with the magnitude of change which
occurred in Carter's individual beliefs.
What exactly did Carter "learn" about the Soviets
during his presidency?

Which fundamental beliefs changed as

a result of his experiences in foreign policy decision
making?

In order to determine this, we must analyze his

beliefs regarding the Soviets before taking office and after
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Carter came to the

Presidency with a determination to make U.S.
more humane and m o r a l .

In a speech at the University of

Notre Dame in May of 1977,

Carter stated that he wanted "a

foreign policy that is democratic,
fundamental values,
we have,

foreign policy

that is based on

and that uses power and influence, which

for humane purposes."

He openly criticized the

Nixon administration's policies for emphasizing too heavily
balance-of-power politics.26

26I b i d . , 48 .
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Carter's views on foreign affairs apparently were
largely formed through his work with the Trilateral
Commission.

The Trilateral Commission was founded by David

Rockefeller in order to provide a forum for elite debate and
accommodation to international change.
Council on Foreign Relations,

Its parent is the

a private U.S. organization

founded in 1918 and a powerful force in shaping U.S. public
policy and opinion.27

The Trilateral Commission's some 3 00

members are drawn f r o m 'international business,
government,

banking,

academia, media and conservative labor.28

key concept is 'complex interdependence1.29

Its

This

perspective holds that the "days of outright U.S. hegemony,
based on the drive towards military and economic
superiority" are over.

As such, the U.S. needs to support a

new collaborative internationalism,

with the economic

dimension gaining ascendancy over the military,

in order to

27John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993'), 111112 .
28Holly Sklar, "Trilateralism: Managing Dependence
and Democracy-An Overview," in Trilateralismf ed. Holly
Sklar (Boston: South End Press, 1980), 2.
29Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the
Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 222.
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construct a framework for international stability in the
coming decades.30
America,

Thus,

the commission strives to engage

Japan and Western Europe in an effort to promote a

more cooperative world.

Its sessions are dedicated to

themes such as aid for the developing countries,
arrangements for fairer exploitation of the oceans and
programs to delay or halt the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.

Carter selected the bulk of his foreign policy

making team from among his associates on the commission,
including such key players as Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown,
Andrew Young and Zbigniew Brzezinski.31

In 1977, no fewer

than twenty-five members of the Trilateral Commission served
in the highest posts of the administration.32
Finally,

Carter had an "intense and instinctive desire

to go down in history as the peacemaker".33

To this end, he

pursued more cordial relations with Brezhnev and the Soviet
Union.
him,

For this reason,

SALT was of particular interest to

as he perceived it to be a means for stabilizing the

30Dumbre 11,

111.

31S k l a r , 100-101.
32Ibid. , 2.
33B r z e z i n s k i , 520.
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U.S.-Soviet relationship and also for reducing the nuclear
threat to human survival.34

Cyrus Vance recalls that during

his first meeting with then President-elect Carter,

Carter

"made clear that one of his highest priorities would be to
conclude a new SALT agreement,

and without linking it to

other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations."35

Reflecting the

importance which Carter placed on further nuclear arms
control agreements,

he writes in his memoirs,

"Our failure

to ratify the SALT II treaty and to secure even more farreaching agreements on nuclear arms control was the most
profound disappointment of my Presidency."36
However,

international events occurring during the

Carter Administration's tenure served to push Carter from a
globalist or interdependent world view focused on
cooperation towards one reminiscent of containment and the
Cold War.

It is possible to identify six key "disturbances"

in the international'arena which had a cumulative influence
over time in reshaping Carter's world view.

These

34I b i d ., 50 .
35Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices
Schuster, 1983), 31.
36Jimmy Carter,
Books, 1982), 265.

(New York:

Keeping Faith

Simon and

(New York: Bantam
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contributed to a perception of his early optimism regarding
the "global community" as being naive and led him to a shift
towards the more

"hawkish" views of Zbigniew Brzezinski,

particularly with regard to the Soviet Union.37
The first of these events occurred in February of 1977
when a Marxist regime seized power in Ethiopia and proceeded
to undertake full-scale war against Somalia over the
latter's territorial claims in Ethiopia.

Although the

Soviets had initially supported the Somalis, by the fall of
1977 they had aligned themselves with the Ethiopians and had
dispatched thousands of Cuban troops to the region in order
to provide military assistance.
Increasingly,

Carter began to perceive this activity

in the African Horn coupled with the expansion of Soviet
influence and military presence in South Yemen to be a
potentially grave threat to the U.S. position in the Middle
East, notably in the Arabian peninsula.
1977,

By late summer of

there was growing evidence of Soviet sponsored

involvement in Africa.

37Dumbrell,

12 8-129.
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direct Andrew Young to make a speech at the U.N. on November
22, 1977 against the Soviet Cuban presence in Africa.38
This tougher stance by Carter was evident in his March
1978 foreign policy speech at Wake Forest University.

In

this speech, he warned:
Our strategic forces must be-and must be known to
be-a match for the capabilities of the Soviets.
They will never be able to use their nuclear forces
to threaten, to coerce, or to blackmail us or our
friends ... Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements
with our adversaries can limit the cost of security
and reduce the risk of war.
But even then, we mustand we will-proceed efficiently with whatever arms
programs our own security requires.39
Shortly after this speech,
invasion of

in May of 1978, yet another

Zaire was launched from Angola, with Carter

again charging that Cubans were involved.

After the U.S.

responded with an airlift of French, Belgian and Moroccan
troops,
June,

the situation calmed.

1978,

Following this incident,

in a

speech on foreign policy Carter projected an

even tougher stance than before towards the Soviet Union.
He was unequivocal in stating continued U.S. commitment to
human rights and his speech was devoid of all conciliatory
passages towards the U.S.S.R. which had marked previous

38Brzezinski, 179.
39Ibid. , 189.
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speeches.

In the speech, Carter offered the Soviets the

choice of either "confrontation or cooperation" and warned
that the "U.S.

is adequately prepared to meet either

choice" .40
At about the same time, the Soviet Union offered aneven greater provocation to Carter.
several prominent dissidents,

By placing on trial

it seemed to be, directly

challenging the Carter Administration's stand on human
rights.

All of the dissidents were found guilty and Carter

condemned the trials as "an attack on every human being in
the world who believes in basic human freedoms."41
responded not only with words, but with actions.

Carter
He

approved economic sanctions against the Soviet Union,
including restrictions on the export of gas and oil
technology,

suspension of scientific exchanges and the

cancellation of computer equipment deliveries.

These

actions gain in significance when it is understood that this
is the first time since the inception of detente under

40I b i d . , 320.
41Dumbrell,

125-126.
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President Nixon that an American Administration had applied
sanctions against the U.S.S.R.42
Also representative of Carter's hardening attitude
towards the Soviet Union was his decision in May of 1978 to
send Brzezinski to China with the intention of paving the
way towards normalization.

This followed the breakdown

earlier that year of Soviet efforts to improve relations
with the Chinese and was undoubtedly viewed with great
concern in the U.S.S.R.43
If in 1978 the Carter Administration had inched toward
a tougher stance vis-a-vis the Soviets, by the end of 1979
it had lunged towards it.
responsible for this shift.

Several key events in 1979 are
First,

the U.S. lost two

longtime American allies in the collapse of the Somoza
regime in Nicaragua and the Pahvlavi regime in Iran.
1978 and 1979,

the regime of Anastasio Somoza,

American ally,

collapsed before a coalition of Marxist

revolutionaries,

In

a long time

the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

American policy was to push Somoza towards a mediated

42Ibid. , 126.
43James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United
States Foreign Policy and World O r d e r r 4th e d . , (New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), 362.
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settlement.

This attempt failed and by mid-1979,

the Carter

administration recognized the new revolutionary
g o v e r n m e n t .44
However,
loss of Iran,

if the collapse of Somoza was disturbing,

the

a surrogate for American power in the Persian

Gulf, was catastrophic.

On January 16, 1979 the Shah fled

Iran in the midst of a revolution against his regime led by
the exiled fundamentalist Islamic leader the Ayatollah
Khomeni.

On February 1, the Ayatollah returned from exile

in Paris and assumed power.

Because much of the revolution

was fueled by intense resentment of a regime that was
perceived to be illegitimate and a puppet government run by
the United States,

the U.S.

lost a key ally in the region

with no hope of regaining the foothold with the new
government that it had lost with the old.
a considerable security risk to the U.S.,

This represented
considering its

dependence on the oil of the Persian Gulf for the
maintenance of its economy.45
Despite the cooling of relations between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R.

which had been occurring since mid-1978,

44I b i d . , 369.
45I b i d .
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and Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement in June of 1979.
Almost immediately,

however,

the treaty was jeopardized by

yet another international problem.

On August 31, 1979,

during the course of hearings and debates in the Senate on
SALT II, Carter reported that intelligence sources had
revealed a Soviet brigade of combat troops present in Cuba.
Although it had been generally known that there had been
Soviet troops in Cuba for the last seventeen years,

the

announcement caused considerable furor.46
The administration continued to hold out hope,
however,

that SALT II would be ratified by the end of 1979

or perhaps in early 1980.

Even this hope was abandoned when

in December of 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.47
The invasion was in support of a pro-Soviet coup directed
against a Marxist regime which proved unable to be
controlled from Moscow and was unable to control its own
Islamic insurgents.

By December 27, 1979,

its leader was

dead and the Soviets appeared to be staying until a new proSoviet regime was well-established.48

46B rzezinski, 346.
47I b i d ., 353.
48Nathan and Oliver,

372-373.
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Although intelligence sources had reported Soviet
troop movements along the borders for sometime,
transformed Carter.

the invasion

As Vance writes in his memoirs,

"The

Soviet invasion into Afghanistan changed the picture".49
LLoyd Cutler refers to Carter's "metamorphosis" following
the invasion.50

Carter sent Brezhnev the most sharply

worded message of his presidency, warning him that the
invasion represented a "clear threat to peace and could mark
a fundamental and longlasting turning point in our
relations."51

Perhaps the most compelling evidence of

Carter's dramatic change in belief regarding the Soviet
Union,

however,

Year's Eve,

is his revelation during an interview on New

1979 that his "opinion of the Russians has

changed more drastically in the last week than in the
previous two and a half years."52

49Vance,

3 90.

50Joseph G. Bock, The White House Staff and the
National Security Assistant (New York: Greenwood Press,
1987) , 146 .
51Carter,

472.

52David Bender, "Carter Says Soviet Isn't Telling
Facts About Afghan Coup," New York Tim es .
1 January
1980, p. 1 (A).
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Carter's learning experience is not only clear in his
words,

but in his actions,

as well.

He writes in his

memoirs:
The Soviet Union, like Iran, had acted outrageously,
and at the same time had made a strategic
miscalculation.
I was determined to lead the rest
of the world in making it as costly as possible.53
Carter proceeded to back these words with actions.
Whereas prior to the invasion he maintained a policy of
evenhandedness between the USSR and the PRC regarding dualuse technology,

following the invasion Carter decided to

offer China non-lethal military equipment and allow high
technology transfers which were not being offered to the
Soviets.54

In addition,

a grain embargo was established

against the Soviet Union and the decision was made for the
U.S.

to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics to be held in

Moscow.

Possibly of greatest import to Carter, however, was

his decision to put on hold indefinitely the SALT II treaty
from the Senate ratification process.55
write in his memoirs,

53Carter,

472.

54V a n c e , 3 91.
“ Brzezi ns ki , 431.

As he was later to

"The worst disappointment to me
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personally was the immediate and automatic loss of any
chance for early ratification of the SALT II treaty. 1,56
The most significant outcome of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan,

however, was the renewed commitment to

rebuilding America's defense and the expansion of her
security commitments to include the Persian Gulf area.
January 23, 1980,

in his State of the Union address,

On

Carter

announced what later was to be called the "Carter Doctrine",
linking the Persian Gulf and its oil to the vital interests
of the United States.

Carter stated unequivocally:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by
any outside force to gain control of the Persian
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the
vital interests of the United States of America, and
such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force.57
Thus, America's interests were explicitly linked to those of
the Persian Gulf region.
In order to defend these interests,

Carter declared,

"We have a new will at home to do what is required to keep
us the strongest nation on earth".58

In practical terms,

these declarations meant a renewed commitment to the build-

56Cart er , 473 .
57Brzezinski, 426.
58Nathan and Oliver,

373.
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up of U.S. military might,

including a defense budget five

percent higher than the previous year and planned spending
on defense that would lead to about five percent per year
increases through the middle of the next d ecade.
addition,

In

a rapid deployment force was established which

would be capable of moving as many as one hundred thousand
men any where in the world with little advance notice.59
Thus,

by early 198 0, detente had been virtually abandoned

and the administration

had turned toward a reemphasis of

security policy reminiscent of the containment policies of
the Cold War.

It seemed clear that early advocates of

interdependence and world order policies no longer shaped
the administration's image of international realities.60
Carter now believed that the Soviet Union was not only
morally bankrupt,

but expansionist as well.

He viewed his

earlier optimism and global community outlook as n a i v e .61
Thus,

Carter experienced a revolutionary change in his

beliefs regarding the Soviet Union specifically and the
nature of international relations in general.

59I b i d .
60I b i d .
61Dumbrell,

12 9.

Initially
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embracing a "dovish" approach, by the end of his
administration he clearly favored a more "hawkish" view akin
to that of his National Security Advisor,
Brzezinski.

By all accounts,

Zbigniew

including his own, he had

experienced a dramatic change in belief which transformed
his fundamental assumptions about the Soviet Union in
particular and the nature of international relations in
general.

Therefore, even according to the more restrictive

belief system approach to learning advocated by Ernst Haas
and certainly according to Jack Levy's definition of
individual learning as involving a "change of beliefs,
skills,

or procedures based on the observation and

interpretation of experience," Carter as an individual
"learned" as a result of his experiences with the Soviets.62
This learning experience produced many policy changes,
such as the Carter Doctrine,
deployment force,

the establishment of the rapid

the withdrawal of SALT II from the

ratification process and a dramatic increase in the defense
budget for the coming years.
changes were,

according to Levy, policy changes alone do not

constitute national learning.

62Levy,

As significant as these policy

2 96.

Rather,

learning at the

38

national level involves the encoding of bureaucratic
procedure which predisposes future decision-makers towards
outcomes consistent with the learning process.
Therefore,

it is necessary to examine if in fact

Carter translated his learning experience into permanent
change in bureaucratic routine affecting the foreign policy
making process.

Because the making of foreign policy is a

complicated affair,

it would help in analyzing this case if

we broke down the foreign policy-making process into smaller
components which can be more carefully studied for evidence
of procedural change.

Philip Zelikow,

"Foreign Policy Engineering:

in his recent article

From Theory to Practice and

Back Again, 11 offers a description of the policy construction
process which serves this function.

Zelikow states that

policy-making may be conceptualized as three interacting
streams,

each of which interact constantly with the other.

The three streams are problem recognition, policy
engineering and politics, which is defined as the way
choices are made.

Zelikow describes policy engineering as

the formation and refining of policy proposals.63

63Philip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering:
From Theory to Practice and Back Again, " in
International Security 18 (Spring 1994), 157.
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logical to assume that it is within the policy engineering
stream that bureaucratic procedural change could most
clearly be identified.
Because bureaucracies such as the State Department and
National Security Council are sites for the formation of
foreign policy options,

it is probable that bureaucratic

change affecting foreign policy would be found within these
two entities.

Therefore, these two institutions

will be

examined in an effort to identify evidence of the encoding
of personal beliefs into bureaucratic routine.

Zelikow

identifies the following seven components to policy
engineering: national interest, objectives,

strategy,

design

(preliminary and detailed), implementation, maintenance,
review.64

and

By carefully studying bureaucratic procedures

affecting these seven areas, we can determine if in fact
Carter encoded procedural change into any of the
bureaucracies dealing with these areas.
Zelikow defines national interest as a "nonoperational goal which is often used as a general
rationalization for whatever preferences actually undergird
a policy" .

He writes further that expressions of national

64I b i d . , 159.
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interest

"only become a meaningful component of policymaking

when the pronouncement tells people something significant
that they did not already know about the future directions
and commitments of the government".65

Was there a change in

or reconceptualization of national interest following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

Yes, the Carter Doctrine

linking the security of the Persian Gulf to the vital
interests of the United States clearly emphasized anew
America's commitment to this area and marked a new reference
point for the formation of policy.
Certainly,
foreign policy.

then,

the invasion did change American

Was this change in policy, however,

accompanied by a permanent change in bureaucratic procedure
that would outlast Carter?

No, a major shift in the tenor

of U.S. policy occurred through the Carter Doctrine,

but

there is no evidence of any procedural changes in the policy
engineering process in the six other areas identified by
Zelikow which would indicate a permanent encoding of
Carter's new beliefs into bureaucratic procedure.

No

significant change in bureaucratic routines affecting policy
objectives,

strategy,

65I b i d . , 160-161.

design,

implementation, maintenance or
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review could be found.

By "significant",

I mean changes

which would be commensurate with the about face in beliefs
which Carter experienced following the invasion.

Thus,

though policy change occurred, no permanent change in
bureaucratic routine affecting foreign policy occurred as a
result of Carter's learning experiences.
These findings call into question the usefulness of
Jack Levy's model of learning at the national level.

It

appears that following an individual-level learning
experience,

individuals do not in fact encode their new

found beliefs into bureaucratic procedure causing the nation
itself to "learn" and change its ways permanently.

The

Carter case study, as was mentioned before, offers an ideal
means for testing this theory due to 1) Carter's dramatic
learning experience and 2) his powerful position within the
government.

Yet, no bureaucratic procedural changes could

be found. This calls into question whether or not an
individual's change in belief,

no matter how dramatic,

is

sufficient for learning to occur at the national level as
Levy defines it.

Ill.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF NATIONAL LEARNING

If national learning does not occur as a result of an
individual's change in belief,
What,

if anything,

how does a nation learn?

does promote permanent change in

bureaucratic procedure and routine which survives
administrative changes and the associated change in policy?
It is my opinion that learning at the national level occurs
not as a result of individual learning which is then encoded
into bureaucratic procedure, but rather as a result of
collective learning by the American people which ignites a
groundswell in public opinion strong enough to permanently
affect the ways in which our government makes decisions

(as

opposed to the decisions themselves, which would merely be
policy changes).

In a sense the nation as a whole "learns".

This conceptualization is supported by recent research
which finds that public opinion on foreign policy and
national security issues is relatively stable, not volatile
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or moody as was once commonly believed.66

This research

challenges the idea that "the public is not sufficiently
informed to reach logical or stable attitudes on foreign
affairs."67

Rather,

the American public,

according to

Robert Shapiro and Benjamin Page, collectively is
"rational".

Public opinion is real, accurately measurable

by survey and highly stable.68

As Thomas Graham writes,

public opinion is sufficiently strong,
virtually automatic.

"If

it can make decisions

Consensus level mass attitudes can

have more impact on decisions than powerful bureaucratic
players" .69
An example of learning precipitated by public opinion
is the

restraint imposed upon the Executive Branch's war-

making abilities following the Vietnam War.

The Vietnam War

was one of the most painful experiences in the entire
history of the United S tates.

An undeclared war in which

66Thomas W. Graham, "Public Opinion and U.S.
Foreign Policy Decision Making," in The New Politics of
American Foreign Policyr ed. David A. Deese (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1994), 193.
67Ibid. , 194.
68Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign
Policy and Public Opinion," in The New Politics of
American Foreign Policy. 217.
69Graham,

2 08.
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50,000 U.S. troops died, the war was primarily waged by the
Executive Branch with Congress having little input into the
goals and strategies of the war.

Although Congress

initially approved the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution
granting the president broad authority to wage war in
Vietnam,

after-1965, neither Johnson nor Nixon sought

congressional approval for their war decisions.
Nevertheless,

Congress continually voted in favor of

military appropriations and the draft, without which Johnson
and Nixon could not have waged war.
However,
in Vietnam,

due to the growing number of U.S. casualties

the uncertainty as to whether or not the war

could be won,

and the doubts about the morality of U.S.

involvement in Vietnam,
against the war.
sentiment,
1969,

the U.S. public increasingly turned

Responding to this change in public

Congress began to assert its war powers.

In

the Senate passed the National Commitments Resolution.

Although it lacked the force of law, the resolution
articulated the Senate's feeling that a national commitment
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"results only from affirmative action taken by the
legislative and executive branches." 70
As the war dragged into the early 1970's,

hostility

towards the war in the minds of the American people
continued to grow.

In addition, Nixon undertook a series of

controversial military actions without consulting Congress
that highlighted to Congress its relative inability to
affect policy.

Furthermore, Nixon's covert war in Cambodia

in 1970 and the publication of the Pentagon papers in 1971
revealing the executive branch's deceptions during the
1 9 6 0 's increased the Congress's resolve to limit the warmaking powers of the president.
In 1973,

Congress passed the War Powers Resolution

curbing presidential war-making and requiring that the
"collective judgement" of the President and Congress be used
regarding the introduction of U.S. troops to hostilities and
the length of time of their involvement.

Specifically,

this

resolution mandated that three main procedures be used to
govern the deployment of U.S. forces:

1) the President must

consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before he

70Leonard W. Levy and Louis Fisher, e d s .
Encyclopedia of the American Presidency (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1994), s.v. "Vietnam War."
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introduces troops into hostilities 2) the President must
report to Congress within forty-eight hours after the
introduction of troops into hostilities,

triggering the

beginning of Congressional oversight 3) after the initial
report by the President to Congress on the commitment of
troops,

the President must terminate the use of U.S.

forces

after sixty days unless Congress has declared war or
authorized the action.71
Thus,

the War Powers Resolution is a clear example of

public opinion precipitating a permanent change in
"bureaucratic procedure", which, according to Levy,
constitutes national learning.

This change directly

predisposes the policy-making process towards certain
contingencies consistent with the learning which triggered
the procedural change in the first place.

In this case,

public concern over the unilateral war-making of the
executive branch sparked a belief change in Congress
regarding its role in the waging of war.

Congress then took

steps to permanently change the bureaucratic procedures for
war-making by encoding its new-found beliefs into a law
which predisposes the president towards greater

71Levy and Fisher,

"War Powers Resolution."
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accountability to Congress.
itself through Congress,

Thus,

the nation,

expressing

"learned" because its beliefs were

encoded into law which has lasted twenty years and outlasted
five different administrations.
A second example of national learning occurring due to
a change in public beliefs is the Intelligence Oversight Act
of 1980. Like the War Powers Act,

this act grew out of the

public's disillusionment with Vietnam.

However,

it was also

precipitated by public outrage following revelations
regarding the CIA's involvement during the 1 9 6 0 's and 1 9 7 0 's
in covert operations including assassination plots against
foreign leaders and the attempted overthrow of
democratically elected leaders.72
Beginning with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974
requiring the President to inform Congress of covert
operations in a reasonable timeframe,
momentum.

the movement gained

In 1976 and 1977 both the House and the Senate

established permanent committees to oversee the activities
of the CIA.

This drive for greater control over covert

operations culminated in the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1980.

This act,

like its predecessor the Hughes-Ryan

72Levy and Fisher,

"Intelligence Oversight Act."
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Amendment,

required the President to 1) find that a covert

operation was vital to the national security of the country
and 2) notify relevant congressional committees.

However,

the Intelligence Oversight Act expanded on the Hughes-Ryan
Act by requiring the President to report any covert
operations conducted by any governmental organizations,
just the CIA.

In addition,

not

it stated that the President

must give prior notification of covert activities to
relevant congressional committees.73
Thus, the Intelligence Oversight Act,
Powers Act,

like the War

is an example of a groundswell of public opinion

resulting in learning at the national level.

As a

consequence of public outrage following revelations of
covert activities authorized by the executive branch,
American people,

acting through Congress,

the

tried to assert

greater control over the nation's foreign policy decision
making.

The nation's new-found beliefs were encoded into

law in the form of restrictions on the executive branch.
These restrictions are permanent,

spanning administrations,

and because they must be considered by the executive branch
before it authorizes covert operations,

73I b i d .

they predispose the
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president towards greater caution due to his increased
accountability towards Congress.

Thus,

the nation learns

from its past not as a result of the experiences of one
individual, but rather following the experiences of many
individuals collectively expressed as "public o p in i o n " .
A third and final example of national learning
prompted by strong public concern is the criteria outlined
9

by Caspar Weinberger in 1984 regarding America's commitment
of troops to combat.

As Secretary of Defense,

Caspar

Weinberger established "six major tests to be applied when
we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad" 74
Though not officially written into law or encoded into
bureaucratic procedure,

these criteria nonetheless continue

to be recognized as conditions that should be met before
troops are committed to combat.
The first criteria stated that before committing
troops to combat,

the U.S. must be certain that the

engagement is vital to our national interest or that of our
allies.

Second, no troops should be committed unless we are

willing to commit enough resources and troops to win.

74Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace
York: Warner Brothers, 1990), 441.
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Weinberger stated,

"If we are unwilling to commit the forces

or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should
not commit them at all."

Third, assuming we do decide to

commit troops, the U.S. must have clearly defined political
and military objectives and well-defined and specified
strategies for achieving those objectives.

Fourth, because

conditions often change as a conflict continues,

the U.S.

must constantly reassess and change accordingly the
"relationship between our objectives and the forces we have
committed--their size, composition and disposition".

Fifth,

the American public and their elected representatives in
Congress must be supportive of the endeavor or we should not
send troops into combat.

Sixth,

"the commitment of U.S.

forces to combat should be a last resort".75
Like the War Powers Act and the Intelligence Oversight
Act,

these criteria emanated from a recognition by policy

makers of mistakes made in the past regarding the commitment
of U.S. troops to combat and the resulting reaction from the
American public these mistakes engendered.
states,

Weinberger

"while these tests are drawn from lessons we have

* learned from the past,

75Ibid. , 441-445.

they also can--and should--be applied
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to the future."

More specifically,

he cites lessons learned

in World War II, Korea and Vietnam in establishing these
criteria.

For example,

in discussing the need for strong

support at home before committing troops abroad, Weinberger
declares,

"We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at

home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in
the case of Vietnam,

in effect asking our troops not to win,

but just to be there."76
These six criteria constitute an example of national
learning for three reasons.

First, as was described above,

they arose from the collective experience of the American
people at war, expressing itself in strong public opinion
favoring greater discretion in the commitment of U.S.
to combat.

troops

Having learned the lessons of Korea and Vietnam

and knowing American public opinion towards these conflicts,
Weinberger sta te s:
...recent history has proven that we cannot assume
unilaterally the role of the world's defender.
We
have learned that there are limits to how much of
our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to
forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace
and freedom.77

76Ibid. , 442-443.
77I b i d ., 439.
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Thus,

these criteria clearly arose from the American

public's reaction to its recent past.
Second,

the six criteria are designed,

as Levy states,

to "dispose the system in certain ways--presumably better
than before--to future contingencies."78

In the speech to

the National Press Club in which Weinberger outlined the six
criteria,

he stated the following:

These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased
negatively for a purpose--they are intended to sound
a note of caution--caution that we must observe
prior to committing forces to combat overseas.
When
we ask our military forces to risk their very lives
in such situations, a note of caution is not only
prudent, it is morally required.79
Thus, Weinberger's six criteria were clearly intended to
steer policy-makers toward more careful review of a given
situation before committing troops,
made to commit troops,

and,

if the decision is

careful forethought and planning

regarding the objectives and strategy of the mission.
this regard,

In

they clearly "dispose the system" towards

greater caution in the commitment of troops.
Third,

though not written into legislation or encoded

into bureaucratic procedure,

78Levy,

2 88.

79Weinberger, 443.
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have proven to be permanent,

being used in policy-making for

the past ten years and spanning three administrations.
example,

as will be shown below,

For

it is clear that Clinton

used these six criteria in evaluating whether or not to
commit troops to combat in Haiti.

It is significant to note

that this decision was made in 1994, a full ten years after
Weinberger's initial introduction of the six criteria.
Further,

the use of these criteria crosses partisan lines.

It is reasonable to say, therefore,

that the use of these

criteria is a "permanent" change in bureaucratic procedure.
Weinberger's six criteria are clearly evident in
President Clinton's decision to commit troops to the
invasion of Haiti.

'Clinton,

in his speech to the nation on

September 15, 1994, discusses at length all six criteria as
they pertain to the Haiti situation.

First,

a large portion

of his speech is devoted to detailing the ways in which the
reinstatement of democracy in Haiti was indeed in the
national interest of the United States.
u s , " Clinton explains,

"History has taught

"that preserving democracy in our own

hemisphere strengthens America's security and prosperity."
Further,

he maintains,

if we don't act "we will continue to

face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its
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constant threat to stability in our region and control of
our borders."

Finally,

Clinton explains that it is in our

national interest to invade in order to "uphold the
reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments
others make to us."80
Clinton also clearly considered Weinberger's second
criteria in deciding on the strength of the forces to be
used during the invasion.

Although it is generally believed

that troops would meet little resistance from the meager
Haitian army, the Pentagon committed a force of 20,000 U.S.
troops to the invasion,

"an overwhelming force intended to

minimize casualties."81

Thus,

Clinton fulfills Weinberger's

criteria of committing troops "wholeheartedly,

and with the

clear intention of winning."82
Addressing Weinberger's third criteria,

Clinton

describes our mission in Haiti as being "achievable and
limited" and states that it is similar to our missions in

80"Clinton's Speech: The Reason's Why," New York
T i m e s . 16 September 1994, 10 (A).

Time,

81Kevin Fedarko, "This Time We Mean Business,"
19 September 1994, 33.
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Panama and Grenada in that it is "limited and specific".83
He then proceeds to outline in detail the two phases of the
mission,

their objectives and the means by which these

objectives will be carried out.

In doing so he addresses

Weinberger's insistence on "clearly defined political and
military objectives" and knowing "precisely how our forces
can accomplish those clearly defined objectives."84
Weinberger's fourth criteria involves the constant
reassessment of the "relationship between our objectives and
the forces we have committed-their size, composition and
disposition".85

Such a reassessment has already occurred,

as the troops were not initially allowed to intervene in the
actions of the Haitian police.

However,

after it became

clear that the troops were demoralized by being unable to
intervene in clear cases of abuse of the Haitian people by
its police force,

this policy was changed.

Thus, a

reevaluation in objectives did occur.
Clinton clearly abided by Weinberger's fifth criteria
in committing troops to Haiti.

83"Clinton's Speech," A
84Weinberger, 441.
85I b i d .

Weinberger insists on having

(10).
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"the support of the American people and their elected
representatives in Congress" before committing troops to
combat.

According to a Time/CNN poll taken in August,

only

31% of the American electorate supported sending troops into
Haiti.86

This criteria clearly

decision-making process.

entered into Clinton's

He acknowledged in his speech of

September 15 that he is aware that "many people believe that
we shouldn't help the Haitian people recover their democracy
and find their hard-won freedom. . .1,87

This fact clearly

predisposed him to greater caution in making his decision.
Though faced with the possibility of losing credibility on
the world stage if he did not invade, he nonetheless had
great difficulty in arriving at the decision in large part
due to lack of support from Congress and the American
people.

Politically,

it clearly was an unpopular move and

this had the effect of delaying his decision to invade and
trying every possible alternative to avoid force.
Ultimately,

this led him to allow the envoy of Jimmy Carter,

Sam Nunn and Colin Powell to travel to Haiti just prior to

86Bruce W. Nelan,
August 1994, 23.

"Invasion on Hold," Time f 15

87"Clinton's Speech," A

(10).
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the planned invasion in an effort to find a peaceful
solution.

This effort was successful and invasion was

transformed into a peace-keeping mission.

Thus,

the lack of

support of the American people was clearly considered by
Clinton.
Finally,

Clinton clearly meets Weinberger's sixth

criteria of making the "commitment of U.S. troops to combat
a last resort".

Over and over again in his speech he

describes the many ways in which the U.S. has attempted to
remove Cedras and reinstate Aristide and democracy through
peaceful means.

He states that for "three years we and

other nations have worked exhaustively to find a diplomatic
solution".

Later, he stresses that despite the failure of

these efforts,

"the nations of the world continued to seek a

peaceful solution".
states,

At the end of his address,

"Let me say again,

he again

the nations of the world have

tried every possible way to restore H a i t i 's democratic
government peacefully. 1,88

Although these statements

themselves testify to the importance which Clinton attaches
to using force as a last resort, perhaps an even more
compelling testament to this fact was his sending of Carter,

88I b i d .
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Nunn and Powell to Haiti to seek a diplomatic solution even
as the invasion plans were underway.
Clearly,

then, Weinberger's six criteria were

considered by the Clinton administration as it deliberated
about the commitment of troops to combat in Haiti.
not formally encoded in bureaucratic procedure,

Though

the criteria

nonetheless served to sway the administration towards
greater caution in its commitment despite the potential loss
of credibility in the world arena should the U.S. not
invade.

Moreover,

the consideration of this criteria may in

fact have forestalled the invasion itself as the
administration tried genuinely,

even at the eleventh hour,

to try every possible means to avoid combat.
regard,

In this

it certainly served its intended purpose in

predisposing decision-makers towards greater prudence in the
commitment of U.S. troops to war.

IV.
CONCLUSION

In assessing the usefulness of a given theoretical
model,

it is necessary to examine both the model's ability

to predict the future as well as its explanatory power.
Jack Levy's model of national learning has been shown to be
lacking according to both criteria.
learning as a "change of beliefs,

Levy defines individual

the degree of confidence

in one's beliefs or skills as a result of the observation
and interpretation of experience."89
definition,

Jimmy Carter,

According to this

as a result of the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan and the events preceding it, clearly learned.
Therefore,

if Levy's model of national learning is correct,

Carter should have encoded his new-found beliefs into
foreign policy bureaucratic procedure at some level of the
policy engineering process in order to predispose the
process towards decisions in accordance with his new
beliefs.

Yet,

as has been described,

89L e v y , 311.
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no evidence of change
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in procedure as a result of Carter's learning is evident.
Hence,

though individual policy-makers may in fact learn,

it

seems they do not take the critical second step and
translate this learning into bureaucratic procedure.

Thus,

Levy's model fails in its ability to predict when national
learning will occur.
Moreover,

in examining those cases where bureaucratic

procedure clearly has been permanently changed and thus,
according to Levy's own definition,

national learning has

occurred,

Levy's model fails to explain this learning

process.

In all three cases of national learning described

above, no individual policy-maker acting as a result of a
personal learning experience is responsible for the change
in bureaucratic procedure.

Rather,

the change emanates from

the learning experiences of the American public as a whole.
Because Levy's model fails to explain these dynamics,

it is

not useful in helping us to better understand national
learning.
Thus, having examined a state-of-the-art model of
national learning and found it to be lacking in its ability
to both explain and predict the phenomena of national
learning,

I propose a revised conceptualization of national
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learning which I believe more accurately reflects the
dynamics at work in the process of national learning.
Hopefully,

this model will prove more useful to political

scientists in understanding national learning.
As was described above in the discussion of the War
Powers Act,

the Intelligence Oversight Act and Weinberger's

six criteria for committing troops to combat,

it seems clear

that rather than an individual bureaucrat being the catalyst
for national learning, public opinion is the determining
factor.

It seems to make intuitive sense that in a

democracy,

permanent change will not result from the

personal experience of one individual, but rather will only
occur as the result of a movement from the people
themselves.
correct.

According to my research,

this intuition proves

Thus, my model identifies the individual voter as

the key to understanding national learning.
this model,

According to

the individual voter receives environmental

feedback which in turn leads to a change in his or her
beliefs.

This change in belief,

broad scale among the electorate,
consensus of beliefs.
turn,

or learning,

occurs on a

developing into a mass

This mass consensus of beliefs,

in

expresses itself through polls and communication with
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elected officials and leads to a response by elected
officials consistent with the public's opinion.

This

response is institutionalized in law or bureaucratic
procedure which is permanent and enduring.
It is important to note, however,

that this model is

only a skeletal framework for understanding national
learning.
change,

There may be other impetuses to bureaucratic

and thus national learning, which work in

conjunction with public opinion which could significantly
enhance the model.

G. John Ikenberry in his study of

American economic policy found the following:
In a variety of historical c a s e s ... government
officials play a more active and innovative
role and state structures play a more
crucial shaping and constraining role than
conventional wisdom predicts.90
Thus,

Ikenberry found that the state often acts as far more

than a terrain upon which decisions are made.

Rather,

it

often acts as an intervening variable which "shapes the
entire course of political battles."91

The same is true of

decisions affecting American foreign policy.

While societal

90G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional
Approach to American Foreign Policy," International
Organization (Winter 1988), 220.
91I b i d .
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forces,

such as public opinion, may be the primary catalysts

to bureaucratic change,

the institutions of the state,

must be recognized as influencing these changes,

too,

as well

because "institutional structures mediate the interests and
capacities of individuals and groups within them."92

Thus,

a possible future line of research to further enhance my
model of national learning would be an incorporation of the
state as an intervening variable in producing bureaucratic
change.
This model is similar to Levy's in several ways.
First,

like Levy,

national learning,

I believe that in order to qualify as
change must be relatively permanent.

Policy change alone is not sufficient for learning because
policy change is rarely permanent.

Second,

I believe change

in bureaucratic procedure and routine to be the vehicle
through which this type of permanent change is achieved.
Bureaucratic procedural change not only tends to be
permanent and enduring, but also provides a tangible way of
determining if in fact learning has occurred.

Thus, both

Levy and I identify bureaucratic change as the dependent
variable in our models.

92Ibid. , 243*-.

Third,

Levy and I also agree on a
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minimalist definition of learning defined as "a change of
beliefs,

skills or procedures based on the observation and

interpretation of experience."93

I regard as superfluous

the ongoing debate regarding whether a change in beliefs at
any level other than the fundamental beliefs level is truly
learning.

As George Breslauer states,

the choice of

definitions of learning need not be consequential,

"as long

as the reader is aware of the definitional choices at
work."94

Finally,

I support Levy in his belief that the

"efficiency" and "accuracy" criteria should be abandoned due
to their subjectivity.

As Levy states,

"To insist on an

accuracy criterion would either result in research that is
less rigorous, more subjective,

and more dependent on the

analytical and normative biases of the analyst or it would
paralyze analysis because of the lack of measurable
standards " .95
Though Levy and I agree on the definitions of both
individual learning and national learning, we disagree on
the key actors involved in national learning.

93I b i d ., 296.
94Breslauer,
95Levy,

2 93.

826.

While Levy
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identifies the policy-maker as the key actor who initially
learns and then encodes change in bureaucratic procedure,
the focus of my model is much broader.
model,

According to my

it is the American public who initially learns and

thus is the key actor.

Levy and I also disagree on the

fundamental mechanism through which national learning
occurs.

In my model,

the mechanism through which national

learning then occurs is the influence of public opinion upon
legislators who then enact bureaucratic change, whereas
Levy's model identifies the policy-maker making changes in
bureaucratic procedure as the primary learning mechanism.
Moreover,

according to my model,

it is not necessary for the

individual policy-maker himself to have learned at all.
Instead of being motivated by learning at the personal
level,

he is motivated by a desire to stay in office and is

therefore responding to his constituency rather than his own
learning experiences.

Thus,

lawmakers may have learned,

this learning is not necessary or sufficient for national
learning to occur.
I also believe that domestic political structure is
critically important to the understanding of national
learning.

Clearly,

the national learning process varies

but
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greatly among different types of political systems.

This

distinction needs to be made clearer in national learning
models.

The field would be well-served by scholars willing

to develop theoretical learning models specific to different
types of political systems.

The need for such

differentiated models becomes clear upon reviewing Sarah
M e n d e l s o n 's above-described theory of learning.

While her

conceptualization of learning is useful in understanding the
dynamics of national learning within an authoritarian regime
and its emphasis on the domestic side of learning is welltaken,

it does not accurately reflect the national learning

process within a democratic government.
power consolidating strategies,
the "Politburo,

Its concept of

such as personnel changes in

Central Committee and various other

ministries" as a key to the understanding of the learning
process cannot be readily applied to a democracy.96

While

Gorbachev may have had the ability to make personnel changes
in such key political institutions,

the executive in a

democracy does not have such sweeping authority.

Thus,

the

environment or political structure in which national
learning occurs must be considered as a key component of any

96Mendelson,

328.
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model which strives to understand the underlying political
processes at work.
Consideration of the context of national learning,
however,

does not mean that varying political systems will

not share any of the same conceptual tools.

For example,

Mendelson's incorporation of the roles of epistemic
communities and ideas in the national learning process are
concepts that also may be useful in understanding learning
in democracies,

as epistemic communities often play a key

role in the shaping of public opinion in democracies as well
as authoritarian regimes.
the media,
opinion.

Often,

through their exposure in

epistemic communities serve as shapers of public
Because public opinion is a catalyst to national

learning in democracies,

these epistemic communities can in

fact have great power within democracies,

as well.

Thus,

there is clearly a need for learning models tailored to
different types of political systems which reflect the
political dynamics specific to each system.
It is clear that we still have much to learn in
understanding the means by which nations learn.

In this

paper I have strived to 1) review some of the most prominent
theoretical models of learning,

2) test one of the

conceptualizations through the case study method,
offer an alternative,

and 3)

hopefully more useful model of

learning at the national level.

This model identifies the

individual American public as the key actor in the national
learning process.

In addition,

this model cites the force

of public opinion on legislators to be the national learning
mechanism and identifies bureaucratic change as the
dependent variable.

Finally,

it incorporates context,

the nature of the political system,
framework.

or

into its theoretical

Though much work remains to be done in an effort

to refine this proposed model,

such as a possible

incorporation of the state as an intervening variable,

it is

my hope that it will serve as a starting point in forging a
more useful national learning m o d e l .
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